Category: History Why the Communists are Winning as of 1976... by William D. Pawley & Richard R. Tryon
Few knew how the game was played in the Caribbean than William D. Pawley. Read here how he worked with Trujillo and others and then saw Cuba fall to the communists.

Chapter Twenty
MISSION TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
1
Early in 1960, when President Eisenhower had only about a year left in office, he once more asked me to see him. He had decided to act on a favorite proposal of mine, long advocated also by former Ambassador to Cuba, Harry Guggenheim. It would increase the prestige and importance of Latin America in our foreign policy by establishing the post of Under Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, including Canada.
I enthusiastically concurred. Castro’s Communist beachhead had been steadily growing and therefore had to be dealt with by a firm policy on Cuba. Further, I believed that our troubled relations with Latin neighbors would be ameliorated through the responsible and intelligent supervision which could then be exercised over the serious trouble-making of Rubottom and Wieland. I strongly urged the nomination of either Walter Donnelly or Henry Holland for the new Under Secretary. But the President responded:
“The reason I called was to offer the post to you.”
I was taken completely by surprise. Despite our close relationship, this was the first time Eisenhower had asked me to take an official post. Late though it was, I saw this as a tremendous opportunity to strike a blow for my deepest convictions. First, plans already approved to oust Castro could be accelerated and brought to fruition before Ike’s term expired. Obstacles over at State had been stalling such plans. I would now be in a position to remove them, expediting a “D-Day” for the invasion Cuba. I accepted with alacrity.
“I was hoping you’d say yes,” Ike told me. “But first, I must ask you to dispose of your mining interests in the Dominican Republic. We don’t want any conflict of interest.”
This was quite a blow, and I asked permission to place my nickel mine stock in a trust under the management of someone else.
I proceeded to the Dominican Republic immediately and disposed of my interest in a letter to Trujillo and Manuel de Moya, stating that I would have an option to repurchase 60% of my stock at the price at which it was sold.
Trujillo accommodated me by taking over the stock on my terms, knowing that the Canadian firm of Falconbridge was making an enormous investment in the Dominican Republic.
After about a week, I returned to Washington and informed the President that I was now cleansed of any suspicion of conflict of interest and was ready to get to work.
“Bill, I’ve got bad news for both of us,” he answered reluctantly. “I can’t go ahead with the appointment.”
My heart sank, and for a moment I was struck dumb. You don’t press the President for his reasons.
It was not until after Ike had left office that I got the background. He told me that when he gave my name to Secretary Christian Herter, the latter consulted his subordinates at State and encountered vociferous opposition. These gentlemen were aghast at the thought of my assuming the driver’s seat for Latin American affairs, where I could see to it that the President’s wishes for Cuba were actually carried out. As Ike told me the story, he confessed that he wished he had forced my appointment through in spite of the enormous pressures placed upon him not to do so. Among them, almost certainly, were the protests of Dr. Milton Eisenhower. The President simply didn’t feel up to a new battle that late in his administration. But, he added that Castro would no longer be in power had he stuck to his original plan for my appointment.
2
The bitter pill of my disappointment was no easier to swallow when my thoughts dwelt on what was happening elsewhere in the Caribbean. After Castro’s assumed power on New Year’s Day, 1959, Communist pressure from Cuba for the revolutionary overthrow of the Dominican regime had steadily mounted. Had he been able to rely on the neutrality of the United States, Trujillo would have had no trouble coping with it.
However, some four months later, a second tragedy for the Latin American interests of the United States followed on the heels of the first. On April 15, 1959, John Foster Dulles resigned as Secretary of State because of terminal cancer. The President replaced him with Christian Herter, a well-meaning, but weak, former Republican congressman, and governor of Massachusetts, 1953-1957.
Under Herter, State adopted the fallacious theory that the leaders of Latin America were waiting for the United States to prove its complete dedication to democracy. Few of these nations were consistent or stable democracies;their devotion to democratic ideals was more often a matter of verbiage than of practice. What they respected in a great power, and what they wanted from us, was firm and virile leadership. This was the sort of simple point that some State Department officials seemed constitutionally incapable of understanding. The Latins needed to know that our President spoke with authority and that his assurances would not be vitiated by underlings.
For better or worse, Trujillo had been the main bulwark of anti-Communism in the Caribbean. By undermining his prestige, the State Department was creating a power vacuum made to order for Castro. It was simultaneously destroying the one focus of militant opposition to the Red Cuban dictator in his immediate back yard.
It struck me as imperative in this situation that Trujillo initiate a transition from dictatorship to democratic rule without further delay.
He could thus cut the ground from under the feet of the ideologists who were mismanaging our foreign policy. If the transition would be engineered from on top, involving a gradual and orderly introduction of democratic processes, I felt sure it would benefit the Dominican people.
The one-man rule of Trujillo had brought the nation impressive economic and social benefits. But it had also involved the ruthless destruction of political opponents, the suppression of such basic freedoms as those of the press and speech, and the creation of vast personal fortunes by Trujillo and his immediate family.
Early in 1960, I expressed these ideas to Senator George Smathers of Florida, after having already sounded out Trujillo and found that his reaction was favorable. Smathers was preparing to leave on a Caribbean trip.
“I don’t mind including the Dominican Republic in my itinerary after Puerto Rico,” Smathers told me. “But I want you to go back there first and talk further with Trujillo, to be absolutely certain that he is receptive to the idea of free elections. As a senator, I can hardly afford to get involved in a possible misfire.”
Given the hostility of the American press toward the Trujillo regime, Smathers’ cautious attitude was realistic. On his arrival in Haiti, an incident occurred which convinced the senator that William Wieland’s influence on our Caribbean policies was baleful. A young Marine Colonel stepped forward from the welcoming party of Port-au-Prince Embassy officials and said:
“Senator Smathers, I am here with a few Marine officers and men to train the Haitian constabulary. Our mission is to head off any Castro invasion attempt through Haiti directed at the Dominican Republic. I recently asked the Commanding General of the Marine Corps for sixty additional officers and men. He informed me that William Wieland of the State Department told him that Senator Smathers had vetoed any further enlargement of my training mission.”
Smathers was as furious as he was astounded.
“You can tell your general that Wieland is a damn liar,” he said. “No senator has the power to make such a decision. But if it were mine, I would have recommended just the opposite.”
As agreed, I conferred again with Trujillo, alone, for additional reassurances about free elections, which he gave me. I suggested that in order to counteract the bad press he had been receiving in the United States, he write some articles presenting his side of the story. I would see that they got published. He complied, and the Miami Herald agreed to carry four articles under Trujillo’s signature on the progress of his country.
By now, Smathers was convinced of Trujillo’s sincerity. We met at the Palace, and were joined by President Joaquin Balaguer (who was to be re-elected President of the Republic after Trujillo’s assassination). The date was February 8, 1960.
I told our host that Smathers and I believed he had done a remarkable job of building up his country. However, we also believed the time had come for an orderly transition to a democratic regime. As matters stood, he was sitting on a powder keg. The choice was between political reform launched and directed from the top, or a bloody uprising in the name of democracy, but instigated by the Communists.
“The United States, in that event, would probably move slowly or not at all,” I said in conclusion.
Trujillo reiterated his promise to convert his regime into a true democracy. He informed us that he would order two-party municipal elections within a year, and nationwide democratic elections in two or three years.
During the preceding month, revolutionary plotters had planned to set off explosions in some 200 buildings in Ciudad Trujillo. Sections of the American press reacted with descriptions of a reign of terror. Actually, 137 persons had been arrested, convicted and sentenced. In almost every case, the plotters received 30-year prison terms. But it was ominous that all 137 came from prominent families. My previous belief in the prospects for genuinely free elections was shaken.
Smathers told Trujillo that the trials had created a lot of adverse publicity in the United States. Would it be possible, therefore, when the higher courts heard the appeals of the accused, for Florida’s Attorney General Richard Ervin to be allowed to observe whether or not the proceedings were fair and in accordance with due process of law?
“I gladly accept,” Trujillo replied.
“You will be the first dictator in history,” Smathers then observed, “to become a champion of democracy.”
Trujillo concluded the meeting with his promise to keep hands off during the forthcoming elections.
On his return home, Smathers followed through by recruiting an impartial board of distinguished American social scientists to observe the elections and to judge and report on their impartiality. They were Dr. Evron Kirkpatrick, Mark Ferber, Dr. Howard Penniman, all of the Political Science Department of Georgetown University; and Richard Scammon, a well-known expert on elections.
3
I next heard from Senator Smathers when he wrote me on March 2nd:
“In my judgment, it is very important that the men who are to be involved in this present program be completely independent of any previous connections with Generalissimo (Trujillo) or any kind of dictator, so that the general public can see that this is a sincere effort being made by the Generalissimo to make a transition of his government from a dictatorship to a democracy...a good start has been made and we must continue to push this movement forward.”
The political scientists duly conferred with Dr. Cruz-Ayala, who came to Washington as Trujillo’s representative. They asserted that it would be difficult to establish a climate for free elections, as this implied a completely unfettered press, with uninhibited discussion of the issues and criticism of the government. It would not be easy to find candidates willing to run. They suggested that Trujillo announce a “package plan” with municipal elections leading to national elections. They also proposed that he commit himself to relinquish power in two years, upon reaching the age of 70.
The Miami Daily News commenced an attack on Senator Smathers’ initiative in trying to implement the transition-to-democracy plan, terming his behavior that of “a blind man at the end of a leash of a seeing-eye dog”. The slur stirred the wrath of my good friend, George H. Salley, a Miami lawyer. On March 4th, he wrote a letter to Bill Baggs, editor of the Miami News, which was so pertinent a criticism of the purely destructive kind of liberal attitude that, even after fourteen years, it may be worth quoting.
“You thereby imply,” Salley wrote of the seeing-eye simile, “that to help Senor Trujillo in any way, even in his announced purpose of shifting his country towards a democratic form of government, could be undertaken only by the sightless, and never by those fortunate folk who possess vision. This, of course, also infers that you are one of those fortunate fellows...
“Apparently it doesn’t matter to you that if the propaganda constantly emanating from the press, radio and television succeeds in tumbling Trujillo, without adequate preparation for a stable government to succeed him, the same chaotic conditions will be created in Santo Domingo which were thus created in Cuba, where they have proved so fertile for the lightning growth of Russian Communism. It doesn’t matter to you, or else you are one who is blind to reality - you are the one who is being led on a leash - and by a dog who is also blind...”
Early in April, 1960, I had published an article in the Miami Herald underscoring the importance of our Dominican Republic plan, which was followed by Trujillo’s four articles. They pointed out that the West had already suffered a disastrous rout at the hands of Communism in the Caribbean and that Trujillo would hold free and peaceful national elections in 1962, “if they are not deliberately disrupted by calculated aggression from Cuba, Venezuela and Puerto Rico.”
On April 7th, Senator Smathers sent a letter to Trujillo by diplomatic pouch, saying that he had “contacted the ablest, most skillful political scientists I would find and solicited their efforts in effecting this proposed transition.” He added that he had chartered an airplane for their flight to the Dominican Republic for an on-the-spot survey of conditions and wished to know whether Trujillo approved.
The response from the Generalissimo was affirmative. Accordingly, on May 10, 1960, I sent a letter to Vice President Nixon:
“You probably remember that Senator George Smathers and I have been working with enthusiasm on an effort to bring about a transition from dictatorship to democracy in the Dominican Republic without bloodshed or chaos.
“Generalissimo Trujillo has seen the need to maintain in the Western Hemisphere some semblance of stability and has consented to his withdrawal from political life in the interest of preserving peace and preventing Communism from taking over.
“If Trujillo were permitted to fall dramatically, we would have another Cuba on our hands. This would be a terrific blow to U.S. prestige and would create a situation for us that would make it impossible for us to prevent the chain reaction throughout the other countries in the Hemisphere.
“Boiling it down to its essence, it appears to me we have three choices:first, to stand idly by and let the left-wingers overthrow Trujillo and create another Cuba; second, to be prepared on a moment’s notice to intervene militarily (this choice is certainly not the most desirable one); or third, to work with the present Dominican Government, as George Smathers and I advocate, to bring about a peaceful transition, which would set Communism back in the Caribbean and would prevent our enemies from scoring another victory.
“Your help in the matter would be of tremendous value, as I am convinced that some of the junior members of the Department of State are anxious for the overthrow of Trujillo without regard to the consequences. In this, Herbert Matthews is the ringleader and there are many more of this type who are contributing to this disaster. With warm personal regards, I am sincerely yours,
William D. Pawley
4
In May and June, Lear B. Reed, a Class Two officer in the U.S. Foreign Service stationed in Ciudad Trujillo, apparently established contact with Trujillo. According to the latter’s interpreter, Otto Vega, Reed had stated that his visits were secret and were motivated by his great admiration for the Dominican leader. The purpose of these meetings, according to Vega, was ostensibly to warn Trujillo against cooperating with Smathers and Pawley in guiding his country toward democracy.
Reed informed Trujillo, again according to Vega, that “a number of people had been trying to interfere in Dominican affairs, offering His Excellency unsolicited advice as to how, and how not, to run the business of government. That as a sincere friend of His Excellency, he considered it his duty to advise him to pay no attention to such interference...”
Trujillo replied (Vega): “That he has never had to be prompted in his work, nor did he have any intention now of changing (as it had been widely publicized in his country), on the occasion of Senator George Smathers’ recent visit to this country. His Excellency had assured him that he was willing to sponsor certain measures of a political nature which would have far-reaching effects for the Dominican people and that, in fact, initial steps had already been taken for the implementation of such measures.”
On June 6th, Reed again telephoned for an appointment. This time he saw only Otto Vega. I found the latter’s account of what was said so damnable that I am quoting from his aide memoire:
“MEMORANDUM: After a prior telephone call to fix a time, I received a visit today at 9:30 A.M. at the National Palace from Mr. LEAR B. REED, an official at the United States Embassy in this city. He explained:
“1. He wanted to know whether it was true that the Dominican Government had been able to obtain copies of reports drawn up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States regarding certain difficulties experienced in that country by Sr. Augusto M. Ferrando, when he was Consul General in Miami. Mr. Reed asked me to ask His Excellency, Generalissimo Trujillo, whether this information was correct. Then Mr. Reed told me the following, mentioning first of all that it was the main object of his visit:
“2. That, through his contacts with the United States Intelligence Services, he had got to know that -- and this he classified ‘a matter of extreme importance’ -- there was a plan afoot whereby two or three ‘representatives of the United States Government’ would shortly arrive in Ciudad Trujillo from Washington, to interview His Excellency, Generalissimo Trujillo, with the object of asking him to give up the reins of power.
“Reed asked me to transmit this information immediately to His Excellency, in the strictest confidence and by virtue of the great sympathy he feels for our leader. He also asked me to say to His Excellency that when the said U.S. representatives explained the object of their visit, His Excellency should control himself and should inform them only that, as the matter was one of such great importance, it would require consideration and that His Excellency would study the matter with the greatest care...”
This incident demonstrates again the machinations which were going on in our State Department, of which I was completely unaware.
Trujillo further assumed that an effort was being made to frighten him into accepting the proposals of the American political scientists. Not the sort of man to buckle under pressure, nothing was better calculated to arouse his fury than the threat of a military demonstration against his country. During this entire period of political crisis, American naval power was conspicuously present off Dominican shores, as directed by State Department policy. Again, I was not aware of this, and am reasonably certain that neither was President Eisenhower.
If the purpose was to frighten the United States into friendship, the maneuver was based on miscalculation. The only consideration likely to induce the State Department to tolerate Trujillo was the conviction that he was the only possible barrier to a Castro-type revolution in his country. Once American policy-makers believed that Trujillo’s anti-Communism was merely an opportunistic tactic, subject to change without notice, his usefulness would appear to them to have ended.
Our hopeful plans to help the Dominican Republic went from bad to worse. The Inter-American Peace Committee of the OAS published a report on June 8, 1960, instigated by Venezuela, that charged Trujillo’s government with “flagrant and widespread violation of human rights.” Shortly thereafter, an attempt on the life of Romulo Betancourt narrowly failed. Allegations were made public that Trujillo had plotted the attempt.
A plenary session of the OAS convened. At first, the United States opposed drastic sanctions against Trujillo and argued for an orderly and peaceful transition to a more democratic regime. But under the pressure of left-wing Latin governments such as that of Venezuela, our State Department agreed to punitive measures. On August 20, 1960, the OAS Council of Foreign Ministers voted that member states should break diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic and suspend arms exports.2
5
In November, 1960, Ike once more summoned me to the White House for a mission of trouble-shooting. He asked me to go back to the Dominican Republic as his spokesman with an urgent request to Trujillo that he step down while there was still time. He concluded:
“I know of no one who might come closer to success...I would like to see the efforts that you and George Smathers have been making bear fruit...See if you can persuade Trujillo to leave the country, accompanied by his entire family, and move to the United States, where he can have a fine farm, keep his yacht and continue to raise the thoroughbred cattle and horses that he is evidently so fond of.
“You must tell him that we’re living in completely different times and that the movement toward democratic forms of government cannot be resisted. I would like to see him reverse the past trends of dictatorships. Now that he has done so much for the development of the Dominican Republic, it is time for him to step aside gracefully and permit free elections.
“I want you to impress upon him, also, that I personally hold no ill feelings toward him, but that I am absolutely convinced that there is no alternative to the suggestions I am making. I am asking you to go to Trujillo because I feel sincerely that he will accept this message through you, whereas it could not possibly be effectively conveyed through official channels.”
“Mr. President,” I answered, “substantially the same proposal was put to Trujillo during the visit which I arranged for Senator Smathers. The Generalissimo was most receptive. I’m willing to have another try, but it’s only prudent to warn you that this time it may not be as easy. He probably doesn’t know any more whom to trust.”
When I arrived at the airport in Ciudad Trujillo, the officials there, all of whom I knew fairly well, informed me that the Generalissimo had asked me to stand by for his call. I waited for fifteen minutes, then took my car, which was at the airport, to the Hotel Embajador for a shower and change. In the lobby, I was about to telephone by brother Ed, who was associated with our nickel company, that I would not be able to dine with him that evening, when my chauffeur rushed in to say that the Generalissimo had just driven up in a small car, alone.
This was utterly out of character and, in view of the plots against his life, a glaring breach of security.
I hurried across the lobby and met Trujillo as he entered. He seemed more serious and reserved than his usual self, as we shook hands.
“Pawley,” he asked, “do you have rooms here?”
“Yes.”
“Let’s go there.”
I sensed that something unpromising was in the wind. We took the elevator to the sixth floor, where I had a parlor bedroom suite toward the far end of the corridor from the elevators. The hotel was almost empty. We met no one but three Jamaican chambermaids, who were goggle-eyed when they recognized my guest.
Trujillo asked me abruptly: “What do you want to discuss?”
For the better part of an hour, I did all the talking, with a growing apprehension that I was getting nowhere. He stared at me impassively. No comments. No questions.
Having covered all the points in Ike’s instructions, I concluded by saying:
“I emphasized to President Eisenhower just how delicate this mission of mine would be. I hope you realize that in raising this proposal, I am thinking of your best interests, and with the knowledge that you are the only person who can properly weigh the alternatives.”
Suddenly, large tears welled up into the eyes of the Strong Man. He took his handkerchief and dabbed at his eyes. When they cleared, he raised his finger and spoke in a voice of controlled fury:
“Pawley, you can go tell Eisenhower that he can come here with his Marines, with his Navy, with his airplanes, and, if he thinks he must, with his atomic bombs, but I am determined that I will never leave this country. I will stay even if I end up on a stretcher!”
I understood in a flash what had made my proposal intolerable:
He must have been receiving information that either I was no longer to be trusted, or that I simply didn't know what was going on. Also, his pride as a soldier had been aroused. A product of U.S. Marine Corps training, he had great pride in the Corps and in the knowledge that he had been rated an outstanding Marine.
Trujillo had so indoctrinated his citizens with garrison traditions that when the flag was raised at dawn and lowered at dusk, all cars had to halt and their passengers get out and stand at rigid attention until the ceremony was over. Given these ingrained precepts, Trujillo’s deep-seated anger upon being ordered, as he saw it, to abandon his native soil, was understandable.
Trujillo recovered quickly from his loss of control and turned the conversation to other matters, including the repurchase of my Falconbridge shares, and the interview was ended. As we walked down the hall, the three chambermaids greeted him from an open bedroom door in the most friendly and affectionate manner, exclaiming:
“Generalissimo Trujillo!”
“Do you see, Pawley,” he said, “everyone in this country loves me.”
On May 30, 1962, some six weeks after President Kennedy’s disastrous mishandling of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Generalissimo Trujillo paid his customary call on his 94-year-old mother, before returning by car to his prize cattle farm, La Fundacion. At 10:30 o’clock that night, two cars, filled with gunmen, ambushed and shot the dictator. They put the body into the trunk of one of their cars.
The assassins proceeded to the house of General Jose Rene Roman Fernandez, Secretary of State for the Air Force and a ringleader. This officer was supposed, according to the most reliable of the published accounts, to summon the entire Trujillo family to La Fortaleza de Ozama in the capital and there to murder them. Unfortunately for General Roman, Trujillo had ordered him to report to San Isidro Air Force Base earlier that day. Since Roman was not at his post, the plan miscarried.
Thus the transition of power was placed in the hands, not of the rebels, but of a Provisional Council, consisting primarily of Trujillo supporters, and including “Ramfis”, the son of the murdered Strong Man. Ramfis was able to assist in maintaining order during the crisis, before decamping for Europe with an alleged huge fortune.
Thus another of my missions for a President of the United States - this one to help bring about a peaceful transition to democracy in a Latin American country, had failed.